A key strategy used by revisionist countries around the world to change the status quo is the strategy of incremental transgressions, commonly referred to as "salami tactics". This strategy involves a series of small steps that cumulatively lead to significant strategic gains. Each individual transgression is too minor to justify a decisive response from the target; however, through a series of iterative actions, a revisionist state can achieve gains that would be impossible with a single, overt move. To resolve the paradox of why victim states fail to effectively counter such incremental aggression, I develop a formal political economy theory informed by economics, psychology and historical precedents. This theory shows why short-term decision-making in response to minor transgressions can lead to long-term failure in preventing larger violations. I evaluate the theory's predictions using an experimental approach through a series of experiments. These experiments examine how internal political dynamics and public opinion shape responses to salami tactics in various deterrence scenarios.
