The decline of institutional trust in Western developed countries is a significant concern, yet its underlying causes remain inadequately understood. This project aims to investigate the agentic role of bureaucrats in shaping public trust in federal government agencies. Utilizing a conjoint experimental design, the study examines how three critical attributes of service-seeking transactions—efficiency (time spent at the agency), performance (effectiveness and the necessity for return visits), and positive bureaucrat-client interaction (the extent to which individuals feel respected and valued)—influence citizens' institutional trust. I hypothesize that, while traditional metrics of performance and efficiency are important, the quality of interactions between bureaucrats and clients may be pivotal in fostering trust. Additionally, the research explores whether these positive interpersonal experiences can mitigate the negative effects of inefficiencies or bureaucratic errors. This study raises essential questions about whether relational dynamics in governmental service encounters can outweigh purely transactional and rational considerations in the development of trust.
